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Abstract — Different schemes for voltage control under emergency are adopted in 
different jurisdictions around the world. While some features, such as Automatic Voltage 
Regulation (AVR), are common in all countries, for what concerns undervoltage load 
shedding (UVLS), to contrast voltage instability or collapse, different schemes are adopted. 
Most US transmission system operators (TSOs) adopt automatic UVLS schemes, with 
different capabilities and settings while TSOs in EU usually do not implement automatic 
UVLS but leave the decisions to the control room operators. The two options may lead to 
different impacts in terms of trajectory and final status of the transmission grid under 
emergency, with different unserved energy. In this paper we analyze the impacts from a 
technical and economic perspective, modeling the grid behavior with different UVLS 
schemes (none, manual and automatic). The comparison between the different schemes is 
done resorting to the Incident Response System (IRS), a software tool developed by the 
authors in the EU-FP7 SESAME project. An illustrative example to a realistic test case is 
presented and discussed. This paper shows that automatic UVLS is superior to Manual 
UVLS, from both technical and economic point of view, due to the fast evolution of voltage 
collapse phenomena and insufficient time for system operators’ manual reaction. The 
benefits of the scheme involving the automatic UVLS can be then compared with the 
investment costs of equipping the network with those devices. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
From historic blackouts [1], [2], [3], one can observe that the main factor of most of 
recent system disturbances is voltage collapse, rather than the underfrequency conditions, 
which were prevalent in the blackouts of the 1960 and ‘70s. In some power grids, such as 
the ones in North America, most of generation sources are located remotely from load 
centers and there is reluctance to allow building new generation plants in urban areas. This 
increases the power system dependency on the transmission network and, in case of 
transmission lines trip, there may be a lack of reactive power in local areas. Therefore, in 
these transmission systems, the protection against voltage collapse is crucial. 
In the operation of power systems, when several failures happen simultaneously, 
commonly used protection relays (low voltage, over current) may not be able to distinguish 
between the voltage/current violations caused by widespread cascading failures from those 
caused by a local fault. This would result in more generators or lines being tripped, 
spreading the blackout area. So dedicated strategies for undervoltage protection are needed 
to avoid large scale cascading failures. 
An analysis performed on blackouts happened in Europe in the past 35 years [21] clearly 
shows that most of them were characterized by low voltage or voltage collapse, during the 
cascading failure, that eventually led to power outage (Table I). 
It appears that frequency and gravity of blackout events are increasing in recent years 
and, due to interdependency of other infrastructures with power system, the blackout 
impacts on other infrastructures and society are growing. One type of system instability 
which can occur when the system is heavily loaded is voltage collapse [22]. Other reasons 
for voltage instability and collapse can be the dynamics of tap-changing transformers [23], 
as these components can aggravate rapid voltage decay [24], [25], the presence of a high 
percentage of loads constituted by induction motors [26], and the presence of small noise in 
load demand [27]. 
These concerns bring the necessity of reinforcing electrical infrastructures against 
undervoltage incidents and investing on new protection schemes to prevent huge negative 
impacts. 
Suitable strategies for prevention of voltage collapse are required in order to save costs 
and mitigate socioeconomic impacts. From the structural point of view, the most effective 
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improvement of voltage stability limits is building new transmission lines and increasing 
generation. But it is very difficult and expensive to find a new corridor for a transmission 
line or a new location for power plants, since the acceptance of new infrastructures by the 
population is everyday decreasing. Therefore, new solutions are being investigated to 
prevent larger blackouts in a more acceptable and economic way. When searching for 
schemes to enhance power system voltage stability, the evolution of adverse events needs 
to be analyzed [25]. 
In today’s transmission systems the problem of reactive power reserve is growing 
because of the restructuring of the power systems involving electricity markets [28]. The 
voltage and reactive power control are now partially ancillary services that need to be 
provided by the producers (in contrast with their economic objectives) to system operators 
[29]. In this framework most of the TSOs are finding it difficult to meet regulatory 
standards and criteria without using automatic transmission controls such as reactive 
switching, Remedial Action Scheme (RAS) [30], and Undervoltage Load Shedding 
(UVLS). Among these control actions, UVLS is becoming more advantageous, being 
reliable and cost-effective in preventing voltage collapse [31]. 
UVLS is widely used in the US while in EU the ENTSO-E recommends to implement it 
within DSOs grids, but up to now it is not widespread [32]. In order to guide system 
operators to make decisions on when and where to allocate undervoltage protection 
systems, a cost-benefit based supporting tool is needed. We resort to a cascading failure 
simulation tool, named Incident Response Systems (IRS) [33], to capture the sequence of 
events during an emergency, leading to a voltage collapse. We model the power system 
behavior with different voltage based load shedding schemes (no undervoltage load 
shedding, manual and automatic) analyzing the impacts from a technical and economic 
perspective. 
In the next section, voltage control strategies under emergency are briefly discussed, 
mainly focusing on different load shedding schemes as countermeasure. In section III, IRS 
will be introduced, highlighting the undervoltage load shedding model. Section IV 
illustrates a comparison among the different impacts of different types of undervoltage load 
shedding with reference to the Austrian grid.  
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2. VOLTAGE CONTROL UNDER EMERGENCY 
Voltage collapse in a power system indicates that the operation is beyond its capability 
for the existing conditions and contingencies. The main symptoms of voltage collapse are 
low voltage profiles, heavy reactive power flows, insufficient local reactive support, and 
heavily loaded systems. The consequences of voltage collapse often require long system 
restoration, which causes a huge amount of unserved energy to large groups of customers. 
The symptoms can be exploited by protective schemes to mitigate the collapse. 
According to IEEE/CIGRE Joint TF report, “Definition and Classification of Power 
System Stability”, the time frame for voltage stability problems varies from a few seconds 
to tens of minutes [34]. Voltage collapses in the long time frames are attracting much of the 
attention and recent investigations. These types of collapses usually occur because of loss 
of significant sources or loss of heavily loaded transmission capability. Simulation tools to 
study time dependent system response in longer time frames have only been relatively 
recently developed, while tools for transient analysis of power systems are very mature and 
widely used [35]. 
As one of the causes of voltage collapse is an excess of load for the given transmission 
system, load shedding is an effective measure and its application is increasing in large-scale 
power systems. 
 NERC’s Operating Policy 6-Operations Planning [36] includes the following criteria in 
Section C-Automatic Load Shedding: “After taking all other remedial steps, a system or 
control area whose integrity is in jeopardy due to insufficient generation or transmission 
capacity shall shed customer load rather than risk an uncontrolled failure of components or 
the interconnection”. 
Most of power system cascading failures include low or very low voltage conditions. 
Voltage collapse can occur over a wide variety of time frames [35]. The voltage variation 
rate affects the types of countermeasures that can be put in place and it depends on time and 
voltage varying characteristics of the system elements like loads, automatic tap changing 
transformers, generator excitation controls, governor and turbine responses, protective 
relays, and other automatic or manual control actions. 
Although several studies show that undervoltage load shedding is a very effective 
countermeasure in preventing voltage collapse, it may not be beneficial to all systems. For 
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example, in systems with fast voltage decay, direct full load shedding is the only solution to 
prevent a larger scale blackout in the system.  
Load can be shed either manually or automatically depending on the rate of voltage 
drop. If the time frame of the voltage drop is in the range of minutes, manual load shedding 
can be implemented in order to stabilize the system, the operator intervention may in fact 
be expected after some minutes. If, vice versa, voltage drop is faster, manual load shedding 
would be too slow to act timely. 
2.1. Manual load shedding 
In the case of manual load shedding, the TSO’s operators should have preplanned 
guidelines and procedures to follow. Blocks of sheddable loads should be predefined and 
preprogrammed on the control system SCADA. The major disadvantage of manual load 
shedding is the burden that is placed on system operators, that have to quickly recognize 
arising voltage stability problems [35]. 
2.2.  Automatic load shedding 
If the voltage perturbation is caused by a single major event on the network, voltage 
drop is fast and manual load shedding cannot prevent voltage collapse. In this case 
undervoltage relays may be used to trigger automatic load shedding. There are two basic 
types of automatic UVLS schemes: decentralized and centralized. In a decentralized 
scheme, relays are installed at the loads which are needed to be shed in case of rapid 
voltage decay. When voltage conditions at these locations start collapsing fast, load 
assigned to that relay is shed. This is somehow like under frequency load shedding and it 
can be considered as one the automatic protections. In this scheme, automatic UVLS reacts 
directly to the measured voltage conditions in a local area. It drops several hundred 
megawatts of load in predefined blocks within load centers, triggered while local voltage 
drops to a designed level, say from 89 to 94%, with a several seconds delay. It sheds load in 
order to restore reactive power balance, to prevent voltage collapse, and to keep the voltage 
problem local when a fast voltage decay is occurring. In this case, interaction between 
manual and automatic load shedding is not a problem and if both systems coexist, the time 
delays of the automatic system should be short enough to prevent overlapping with the 
manual procedure [35]. 
 DOI: 10.1016/j.epsr.2015.10.016 
© 2016. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
6
When the voltage collapse evolution is slow, relays at the low voltage side of a tap-
changer transformer may not sense low voltages while transmission system voltages may 
drop excessively.  The centralized schemes aim to protect system in case of slow voltage 
collapse (several minutes to one hour): all measurements are conveyed to, and all the 
decisions are taken by a central control center, undervoltage relays are installed at key 
system buses and trip information is transmitted to shed load at various locations [37]. In 
this case, interaction between manual and automatic load shedding may be a problem as the 
time scales might overlap.  
The main problem connected to an automatic system is the appropriate setting of the 
devices, which means proper voltage thresholds and proper time delays. The undervoltage 
relays should not operate in case of temporary low voltage events which do not lead to 
collapse. For example, low voltages caused by load pickup or by normally cleared faults 
must be discriminated and the UVLS system should not be triggered. The UVLS scheme 
setting, including voltage thresholds, time delays and predefined loads to be shed in 
emergency, need to be coordinated with the other  protection relays.  
These countermeasures are suggested in the current NERC (North American Electric 
Reliability council) regulations and widely implemented in North American power systems 
[38]. 
3. CASCADING FAILURE SIMULATION 
In this section, first we briefly introduce a simulation framework we implemented as a 
software tool: Incident Response System (IRS) [33], which chronologically simulates the 
sequence of post-contingency failures (“cascading failure”) and the restoration actions on a 
time-frame scheme. More details on the specifications of this simulation framework and the 
modelled components of a power system can be found in the SESAME project deliverable 
named “System Specification of Decision Support System” [33]. As the focus of the paper 
is on cost-benefit analysis of manual and automatic undervoltage load shedding, then we 
explain how the manual and automatic undervoltage load shedding are modeled in this 
framework. 
3.1 Incident Response System 
A cascade occurs when there is a sequential tripping of numerous transmission lines and 
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generators in a wide geographic area. It can be triggered by only a few initiating events we 
call “triggering events” which are materialized form of natural, accidental or malicious 
threats to power systems [21]. 
In the IRS (Fig 1), we modeled a large set of existing automatic countermeasures as well 
as human optimal operation decisions. The purpose is to model, evaluate and compare the 
effective countermeasures for system operators, especially the long-term investment; 
therefore, the observation windows we use are from several minutes to days. With such 
large observation window, dynamics are hardly observed. Therefore, all components are 
represented by a quasi steady-state model. Quasi steady-state means that each snapshot is 
solved by a steady state model, but the variation of some quantities (e.g. frequency, voltage, 
etc.) between different snapshots is also modeled. All common power system elements 
including generators, branches and loads are modeled as well as capacitor and shunt 
inductor banks, phase shifters, FACTS devices, DC lines, and pumped-storage stations. The 
system power-frequency characteristic for the entire system, including generator droop and 
load frequency response are considered. To model frequency control such as primary 
control, loads are modeled sensitive to frequency. The self-regulation of the load has been 
also applied assuming 1%/Hz [32], which means a load decrease of 1 % occurs in case of a 
frequency drop of 1 Hz. Voltage collapse is studied in steady state simulation using 
constant MVA loads having no voltage sensitivity, which may result in the most 
pessimistic outcome. As the simulation framework is mainly designed to perform a trade-
off analysis to compare different countermeasures effectiveness under the same conditions 
(e.i. the most dramatic situation with respect to voltage violations), the analysis conclusion 
remains valid. 
As human optimal decision making requires more time with respect to the system 
automatic reactions, IRS enables user to set a time before which only automatic protection 
schemes are considered in simulation. These actions mainly include: frequency control 
(including primary control, secondary control, reserved generation, and automatic/manual 
under frequency load shedding (UFLS)) , voltage control (including automatic voltage 
control (AVR) and automatic/manual undervoltage load shedding (UVLS)), component-
wise protections (modeling under/over voltage relays for all the parallel-connected 
components, over current relays for all branches and generators under/over frequency 
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relays), human non-optimal operational intervention, and system feasibility evaluation. 
 As soon as IRS reaches the predefined time in simulations – called second-stage 
reaction initiating time –, if no new equilibrium point is established, it first tries to find a 
feasible solution for the system by minimizing load shedding through optimization 
modeling and prioritizing loads. After establishing a new system equilibrium, it mainly 
aims to restore the system and the loads. It also implements the black start procedure if 
needed.  
IRS is flexible to handle network islanding so that in case of system split due to line 
disconnections, all islands can be treated separately and simultaneously. Moreover, islands 
can get integrated during the restoration, depending on branches’ re-closure time. 
A scheduler is designed to schedule triggering events occurrence, all system time-
dependent automatic protections, load curve following and modification of system element 
settings as a flexible model of human driving actions (like manual load shedding, 
generators operational status, etc.) as well as human optimal decision initiating time. 
The evolution of the system status is observed in discrete time points called system 
snapshots. The time-points are provoked by user set intervals and special events during the 
simulation. Simulation end time as an input is also defined by user. The total unserved 
energy for this given amount of time is calculated by the software, and it can be translated 
into economic losses. Benefits of different types of countermeasures can then be evaluated 
comparing their implementation cost with the reduction of unserved energy cost. 
As in this paper, we focus on analyzing the benefits of automatic undervoltage load 
shedding, in this section we focus on modelling different undervoltage load shedding 
schemes  and shortly describe the undervoltage control module in IRS. 
3.2 Modeled UVLS 
The common voltage control measures, such as direct load tripping, generators 
Automatic Voltage Control (AVR),  transformer automatic LTC action, LTC blocking, 
capacitor bank switching, SVCs, common voltage protection relays,  are modeled in the 
IRS. In addition, in IRS, we modeled both manual and automatic UVLS, which will be 
briefly discussed here. 
Manual load shedding may be required to backup the automatic scheme.  To model the 
manual LS, the software is flexible to involve human intervention by predefining the 
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voltage and load amount for a specific time after triggering events occurrence. 
Since voltage collapse may happen suddenly, there might not be enough time for 
operator interventions to stabilize the system. Therefore, an automatic undervoltage load 
shedding scheme is needed as an effective means to rescue the interconnected systems and 
mitigate the voltage collapse effects. 
Some existing automatic undervoltage load shedding application schemes are 
summarized in reference [39]. Some utilities such as Hydro Quebec and New Mexico 
installed centralized controller; some cases like Entergy and Southern Sweden applied 
UVLS function as part of EMS; and in some cases such as Puget Sound and Northeast Ohio 
decentralized U/V relays installed in substations were utilized. 
It is not possible to find a generic load shedding scheme to be suitable for all systems; in 
some grids, shedding only a nominal amount of load in one step may be an enough remedy 
while in some others more extensive schemes using two or more levels of load shedding 
with corresponding multiple voltage pick-up points and time delays are needed. As well, 
for some power systems, centralized schemes might be more efficient. 
In IRS, the implemented automatic UVLS scheme is a basic scheme which mainly 
models the decentralized type; however it can be customized by the user for individual 
regulated plans. The main characteristics of UVLS schemes are voltage threshold values, 
time delays, locations and amounts of load to be shed. No generic values are defined for 
these parameters by different regulations or standards and they all depend on individual 
systems. Nevertheless, having studied the implemented schemes, we found ranges of 0.85-
0.95 for the voltage threshold value, 1-10 seconds for the time delay, and 5-20% for the 
amount of shed load as the most common setting values. 
There are sometimes several shedding steps containing different load amounts, voltage 
threshold values or time delays. In our modeled UVLS scheme, these values can be 
predefined by user. IRS receives the bus information including the substations where the 
loads have relays for shedding by percentage, the voltage threshold value in which 
automatic UVLS is executed, time delay and amount of load to be shed in maximum 3 
allowed steps. To run UVLS the transmission system voltage (bus voltage) are measured 
considering contingencies like line trips. As voltage conditions at these locations begin to 
collapse, load assigned to that relay is shed.  
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4. IMPACTS ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENT SCHEMES 
In order to analyze the benefits of undervoltage load shedding, we apply the IRS to a 
simplified model of the Austrian grid on which a contingency scenario is applied, which 
results in an outage in case no undervoltage load shedding is considered. 
The Austrian base case model is extracted from an approximate model of the European 
interconnected system presented by Qiong Zhou and Janusz W. Bialek [40].  For the load 
flow model, only publically available data was used. The base power flow solution has 
been modified to ensure n-1 contingency compliance. 
To extract and isolate the Austrian network from the European interconnected system 
we capture a snapshot of the transmission system operation status including power flow of 
tie lines between Austria and its neighboring countries. Then in order to model the tie-lines, 
equivalent generators are assigned to the neighboring buses which represent the 
imported/exported power from/to Austria. The equivalent generator capacity was set as the 
corresponding tie line capacity. In the test system, there are totally 39 generators among 
which 14 generators are tie-lines equivalent models, 49 buses, 114 branches (including 30 
inter-ties) and 19 loads with a total consumption of 6793 MW and 1888.5 Mvar. The 
system total generation capacity is 19400.5 MW and ±16920.0 Mvar and actual in-service 
production is 6793.4 MW and 3649.2 Mvar. 
The network data extracted from reference [40] mainly includes power flow related data, 
while some other technical parameters/settings such as protection settings, restoration time 
and costs, generation droop, etc., required for the IRS physical network model [33], are set 
according to previous studies [43]. 
The assumptions needed to design the scenarios (technical parameters, imminent natural 
threats, protection schemes, operator behavior in emergency situations) have been taken 
from the security project SESAME, whose outcome has been confirmed by the Austrian 
Regulator (E-Control). For the simulation of the load profile we use the Austrian load curve 
(24 values, time intervals of 1 hour), taken from Austrian Power Grid (APG) for 01-07-
2010 [41], as the basic pattern to scale out the load curve for our test case. The active load 
of the test case was 6793.38 MW at 14:00, while the active load from the APG curve at the 
same time is 6246.93 MW, so we scale the APG curve by a ratio of 6793.38/6246.93 before 
using it in the simulation. 
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In the designed scenario, we assume a flood as natural threat to the Austrian power grid 
which destroys one generator and 2 transmission lines (triggering events) at 14:20 (Fig 2). 
We set 20 minutes after triggering events occurrence, operator starts making optimal 
decisions – explained in the previous section - and 5 minutes as the interval between two 
consequent captured snapshots of the system before arriving at the above-mentioned time. 
In order to reflect system instantaneous reaction or changes at the triggering events 
occurrence time, IRS represents two snapshots for the time 0- and 0+ (at 14:20- and 14:20+). 
Loosing generators, disconnection of lines or loads outages are some examples of system 
sudden variations which result in different snapshots in terms of system status. The interval 
between two snapshots during operator optimal decision making simulation is set to 15 
minutes however, when the system load changes (load curve values change every hour), the 
IRS automatically generates an additional snapshot (in the test case at 15:00 which is only 5 
minutes after the previous one). Consequently, the system status evolution is described by 
10 snapshots. In Table II a summary of important events/effects (defined in [33]) which 
happen during a time interval are briefly mentioned at the end of each interval. 
For the undervoltage protection relays, 0.83 pu is assumed as the threshold and 9 
minutes as tolerance delay after which the load is totally shed in case voltage is not 
corrected. The voltage threshold for the automatic UVLS relays is set 90% of the normal 
value based on the implemented UVLS protection relays in Puget Sound, Washington, US, 
as it is one of the most typical schemes [31]. According to this guideline, “the relays 
operate when the voltage is below a set threshold, for a minimum time duration”. 
Considering the time needed for human decision, we assume the manual load shedding 
happens between 5 to 10 minutes after the contingency. Therefore, the effects can be 
captured at the end of second time interval, i.e. 10 minutes after the event. 
The post-contingency behavior of the system during one hour is simulated by IRS 
considering 3 cases: a base case without any kind of undervoltage load shedding, a case 
with manual undervoltage load shedding and finally a case with deployed automatic 
undervoltage load shedding. Besides technical effects such as voltage magnitude profiles of 
some buses, the impact on the system in terms of unserved energy is assessed and 
compared. 
In the simulated scenario voltage drop is one of the main effects of the 
 DOI: 10.1016/j.epsr.2015.10.016 
© 2016. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
12
triggering/cascading events, which causes cascading failures such as line trip due to 
overcurrent. Fig 3 presents a comparison among the 3 different cases in terms of voltage 
magnitude evolution in the buses where low voltage is observed (A-10, A-11, A-12, A-13, 
A-14, A-16, A-18 and A-30 in the Austrian grid [40]).  
Simulation results for the base case with no UVLS show the voltage drops in some 
buses in the center of network which lead to load interruption and line trip due to 
undervoltage and overcurrent protection relays reaction. This eventually causes power 
outage in most parts of the network (Fig 4) after 1 hour.  
In the case with manual UVLS, 10 minutes after severe low voltage observation, the 
operators shed the interruptible portion of the loads (18% of total loads supplied from buses 
A-13 and A-14). As low voltage is more wide speared than only these 2 buses and this load 
shedding cannot correct voltage sufficiently, 5 minutes later we see the 2 loads are totally 
disconnected as undervoltage protection relays do not allow violation persists for more than 
9 minutes (violation is observed at 14:25). 
In the case with automatic UVLS, some undervoltage relays are assumed to be installed 
in central buses of the Austrian grid to monitor substation bus voltage, and to trip selected 
breakers at that bus. The relays operate when the voltage is below 90% of the normal 
voltage magnitude and shed 5% load at each step. 
Table II summarizes some general descriptive information of the 10 snapshots for the 3 
cases. 
System post-contingency evolution in the 3 different cases results in 3 different unserved 
energy values. Fig 5 depicts total served load amounts during the cascading evolution and 
Fig 6 provides a comparison of all 19 loads trend in one glimpse.  Vertical axis presents 
active served loads in MW. 
The 3 cases (without/with manual/with automatic UVLS) can be analyzed comparing 
the different unserved energies with the UVLS scheme implementation cost and extra 
operational costs due to increasing generators power output and load shedding cost. In 
order to monetize the impact of the UVLS on the level of security of supply, the total costs 
can be compared.  
We calculate the cost of unserved energy according to the general formula, Cu= G/E 
where Cu is the cost of unserved energy, G is the GDP and E is the domestic electricity 
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consumption: G and E values for year 2010 are taken from key statistics 2011 report of the 
Austrian regulator (E-Control) [42]. Considering the calculated cost of unserved energy as 
3800 €/MWh, the value of the economic loss in our case study would be 16,087,680 € 
without UVLS, 5,246,280 € with manual UVLS and 3,091,300 € with automatic UVLS. 
Neglecting the small amount of extra operational cost, 12,996,380 € (the economic loss 
difference between the case without UVLS and the case with automatic UVLS) and 
10,841,400 € (the economic loss difference between the case without UVLS and the case 
with manual UVLS) are the avoided costs thanks to the implementation of the automatic or 
manual UVLS schemes as countermeasures. For a cost/benefit analysis, the avoided costs 
can be compared with the cost of UVLS implementation. 
It should be noted that, in this example, the analyzed time frame is 1 hour, in which most 
of the loads cannot get restored in the base case without UVLS. This means that until the 
end of system recovery process - which takes much more time than 1 hour and is not 
simulated here - the amount of unserved energy would be much higher, and should be 
considered for the cost-benefit analysis. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Voltage collapse has been a critical issue in many recent blackouts. According to the 
results of the cost-benefit analysis proposed in this paper, UVLS is a key-measure,  to arrest 
voltage collapse, especially during extreme contingencies. UVLS schemes are being widely 
installed to bulk power delivery substations in the power networks supplying to densely 
populated areas especially in the US. In the European countries instead, the UVLS has been 
suggested but not actually implemented. This study can technically and economically 
support the recommendations from regulations for UVLS implementation and deployment. 
The benefits of applying UVLS can be observed in both technical and economic aspects. 
From the technical point of view, the UVLS can prevent power outages due to the fast 
voltage decay and accelerate voltage recovery. From the economic point of view, it can 
avoid a large amount of societal losses; as has been shown by the simulated case, the saving 
can be up to 67 % and 81 % of total economic loss by applying manual and automatic 
UVLS respectively. 
In case of fast evolution of voltage collapse and insufficient time for operators to apply a 
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wise quick decision, Automatic UVLS is proved to be a cut above Manual UVLS. 
It is strongly recommended that the UVLS should be implemented in the European 
transmission systems which can greatly mitigate the risks of voltage collapse and blackouts, 
with associated long term economic savings. 
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Table I – BLACKOUTS INVOLVING UNDERVOLTAGE IN EU 
Country and Area Date Main references 
France – Eastern part of the country 19/12/1978 [4] 
France – Western part of the country 12/01/1987 [4] 
France – Western part of the country 26/12/1999 [5],[6],[7] 
UK – London Southern area 28/08/2003 [8],[9] 
Croatia (Southern part of the country) and Bosnia Herzegovina 12/01/2003 [10],[11],[12] 
Sweden Southern part of the country) and Denmark (Eastern part of 
the country) 
23/09/2003 [13],[14],[15] 
Italy – All the country except for Sardinia 28/09/2003 [16],[17] 
Norway – Bergen, larger part of Horland and northern parts of 
Rogaland 
13/02/2004 [13],[18],[19] 
Greece – Athens area 12/07/2004 [13] 
Poland 26/06/2006 [20] 
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Table II A DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY OF SYSTEM SNAPSHOTS DURING 1 HOUR STUDY 
INTERVAL 
Snapshots Description of snapshots 
Clock 
Time 
Time 
[min] Without UVLS With Manual UVLS With Automatic UVLS 
14:20 0-  System normal 
operation 
System normal operation System normal operation 
14:20 0+ 1 generator and 2 lines 
trip 
1 generator and 2 lines trip 1 generator and 2 lines trip 
14:25 5 
Sever voltage drop in 
some buses (2 buses less 
than 0.83, 4 buses less 
than 0.9), voltage 
protection relays sense 
the violation 
Sever voltage drop in some 
buses (2 buses less than 0.83, 4 
buses less than 0.9), voltage 
protection relays sense the 
violation 
Sever voltage drop in some buses 
(2 buses less than 0.83, 4 buses 
less than 0.9), voltage protection 
relays sense the violation 
14:30 10 
Voltage drop in some 
buses (2 buses less than 
0.83, 4 buses less than 
0.9), overcurrent in 2 
lines 
18 % of the loads on 2 buses as 
their interruptible portion are 
shed manually, voltage drop in 
6 buses  
5% automatic undervoltage load 
shedding on 6 buses (voltage 
threshold 0.90 pu), voltage 
correction, no relay threshold 
violations 
14:35 15 
Tripping 2 lines, power 
outage in 2 loads by 
protection relays action 
power outage in 2 loads by 
protection relays action since 
load shedding could not 
correct voltage well, no 
overcurrent, voltage correction 
5% automatic undervoltage load 
shedding on 4 buses where still 
voltage magnitude is below 0.9 
pu 
14:40 20 
Under frequency load 
shedding in some loads, 
severe low voltage 
observation in some 
central buses (more than 
5 buses less than 0.83) 
Load restoration in 2 buses, 
voltage drop in 5 buses 
(however protection relay 
threshold, 0.83, is not violated) 
5% automatic undervoltage load 
shedding on 3 buses where still 
voltage magnitude is below 0.9 
pu, start bringing the network 
voltage back to its normal level 
14:55 35 
Tripping of many lines, 
widespread power 
outage  (85 % unserved 
load), the lines’ tripping 
caused the separation of 
the network 
Load shedding minimization 
bringing system to a feasible 
operational point 
Voltage correction, no more 
loads are shed, frequency gets 
back to the reference value (50 
Hz) 
15:00 40 Still 85 % of system 
total load is not supplied 
Voltage correction, load 
restoration 
re-dispatching of the power, 
System feasible 
15:15 55 
Demand decreases to 
follow load curve in the 
supplied island (west of 
Austria), the rest of 
network still in blackout 
No voltage/current violation, 
re-dispatching of the power, 
load decrease following load 
curve, most of the load are 
restored to the full demand 
No voltage/current violation, re-
dispatching of the power, load 
decrease following load curve, 
most of the load are restored to 
the full demand 
15:20 60 
The same status as 
previous snapshot 
4233.6 MWh total 
unserved energy 
More loads are restored to the 
full demand,  
1380.6 MWh total unserved 
energy 
More loads are restored to the 
full demand, 
813.5 MWh total unserved energy 
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Fig 1 High level flowchart of IRS framework 
 
 
Fig 2 Austrian grid with the triggering events at 14:20 on 01-07-2010 
 DOI: 10.1016/j.epsr.2015.10.016 
© 2016. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
21
  
 
Fig 3 Voltage magnitude [p.u.] of some buses in the 3 simulated cases  
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Fig 4 System snapshot at 15:20 (simulation end time) in case with no UVLS 
 
 
Fig 5 Total served load during the cascading evolution in the 3 cases 
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Fig 6 comparison of load shedding in the 3 cases 
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